Bava Kamma 102

Chapter 102

א לימא הא רבי הא רבנן
1 Are we to say that the former statement<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Making them all liable. ');"><sup>1</sup></span>
ב אמר רב זביד הא והא רבנן עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן אחרון חייב אלא היכא דלא עבד קמא שיעור מיתה אבל היכא דעבד קמא שיעור מיתה אפילו רבנן מודו דכולן חייבין
2 follows the view of Rabbi<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who in the case of mere injury makes them all liable. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
ג והא סייד וכייד דקא עבד קמא שיעור מיתה וקתני אחרון חייב אמרי התם שלא היה בו הבל למיתה ובא אחר והוסיף בה הבל למיתה
3 whereas the latter<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Making the second liable in all cases. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
ד איכא דאמרי אמר רב זביד הא והא רבי הך דקתני כולן חייבין שפיר הא דקתני אחרון חייב כגון שלא היה בו הבל לא למיתה ולא לנזקין ובא אחר והוסיף בו הבל בין למיתה בין לנזקין
4 follows that of the Rabbis?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Making the second liable in all cases. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
ה אמר רבא הניח אבן ע"פ הבור והשלימה לעשרה באנו למחלוקת רבי ורבנן
5 — R. Zebid thereupon said that the one statement as well as the other could be regarded as following the view of the Rabbis.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Making the second liable in all cases. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
ו פשיטא מהו דתימא למטה הוא דהבלא דידיה קא קטיל ליה אבל למעלה דלא הבלא דידיה קא קטיל אימא לא קמ"ל
6 For even there [in their own case] the Rabbis would not say that the last digger should be liable, save in a case where the first digger did not make the pit of the minimum depth capable of killing, whereas [in this case] where the first digger made the pit of the minimum depth capable of killing even the Rabbis would agree that all the diggers should be liable.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence the liability upon all of them in the former Baraitha. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
ז בעי רבא טם טפח וסילק אבניו מהו מי אמרינן מאי דעבד שקליה
7 But, [what of] the case of [the second] lining it with plaster and cementing it,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 296, n. 7. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
ח או דלמא נסתלקו מעשה ראשון וקמה ליה כוליה ברשותיה תיקו:
8 where the first digger made the pit of the minimum depth capable of killing, and yet it was said that the second would be liable? — It may be answered that the case there was where the unhealthy air was not sufficient to kill,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As where its width was more than its depth. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
ט אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר שמואל בר מרתא בור שמונה ומהן שני טפחים מים חייב מ"ט כל טפח דמיא כתרי דיבשה דמי
9 and it was the other person who, by diminishing the size of the pit increased the dangerous effect of the air so as to make it capable of killing. Some report that R. Zebid said that the one statement as well as the other could he regarded as following the view of Rabbi.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 296, n. 9. ');"><sup>7</sup></span>
י איבעיא להו בור תשעה ומהן טפח אחד מים מהו מי אמרינן כיון דלא נפישי מיא לית ביה הבלא או דלמא כיון דעמיק טפי אית ביה הבלא
10 About the statement that they would all be liable there is [on this supposition] no difficulty. And as for the other statement that the second digger would be liable, this refers to a case where e.g., the unhealthy air was sufficient neither to kill nor to injure, and it was the other person who by diminishing the size of the pit increased the dangerous effect of the air so as to make it capable of both killing and injuring.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In which case it stands to reason that the second person only should be liable. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
יא בור שבעה ומהן שלשה טפחים מים מהו מי אמרינן כיון דנפישי מים טפי אית ביה הבלא או דלמא כיון דלא עמקא לית ביה הבלא תיקו:
11 Raba said: The case of a man putting a stone round the mouth of a pit and thereby completing it to a depth of ten handbreadths is one which brings us face to face with the difference of opinion between Rabbi and the Rabbis.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As to whether the second person or both of them would be liable in cases of injury. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>
יב בעא מיניה רב שיזבי מרבה הרחיבה מהו א"ל הרי מיעט הבלא א"ל אדרבה הרי קירב הזיקא
12 Is this not obvious? — You might perhaps think that [the difference of opinion] was only where the increase in depth was made at the bottom, in which case it was the unhealthy air added by the second digger that caused death, whereas where the increase was made from the top,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As in the case stated by Raba. ');"><sup>10</sup></span>
יג אלא אמר רב אשי ניחזי אנן אי בהבלא מיית הרי מיעט הבלא אי בחבטה מיית הרי קירב הזיקא איכא דאמרי אמר רב אשי ניחזי אנן אי מההיא גיסא נפל הרי קירב הזיקא ואי מאידך גיסא נפל הרי מיעט הבלא:
13 in which case it was not the unhealthy air added by him that caused the death, it might have been said that there was no difference of opinion.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And that according to both Rabbi and the Rabbis the second person should not be liable. ');"><sup>11</sup></span>
יד איתמר בור שעומקה כרחבה רבה ורב יוסף דאמרי תרוייהו משמיה דרבה בר בר חנה דאמר משמיה דרבי מני חד אמר לעולם יש בה הבל עד שיהא רחבה יתר על עומקה וחד אמר לעולם אין בה הבל עד שיהא עומקה יתר על רחבה:
14 We are therefore told<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By Raba. ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
טו עבר עליו הראשון ולא כסהו: וראשון מאימת מיפטר רבה ורב יוסף דאמרי תרוייהו משמיה דרבה בר בר חנה דאמר משמיה דרבי מני חד אמר משמניחו משתמש וחד אמר משימסור לו דליו
15 [that this is not the case].
טז כתנאי המדלה מים מן הבור ובא חבירו ואמר לו הנח לי ואני אדלה מים כיון שהניחו משתמש פטור רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר משימסור לו דליו
16 Raba raised the question: Where [the second comer] filled in the one handbreadth [which he had previously dug] with earth, or where he removed the stones [which he had previously put round the mouth of the pit], what would be the legal position? Are we to say that he has undone what he had previously done,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And thus released himself from further responsibility. ');"><sup>13</sup></span>
יז במאי קמיפלגי רבי אליעזר בן יעקב סבר יש ברירה
17 or rather perhaps that the act of the first digger had already been merged [in the act of the second] and the whole pit had since then been in the charge of the second? — Let this remain undecided.
יח האי מדידיה קא ממלא והאי מדידיה קא ממלא ורבנן סברי אין ברירה
18 Rabbab b. Bar Hanah said that Samuel b. Martha stated: Where a pit is eight handbreadths deep, but two handbreadths out of these are [full] of water, there would be liability,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If an animal fell in and was killed. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
יט אמר רבינא ואזדו לטעמייהו דתנן השותפין שנדרו הנאה זה מזה אסורין ליכנס לחצר ר"א בן יעקב אומר זה נכנס לתוך שלו וזה נכנס לתוך שלו
19 the reason being that each handbreadth [full] of water is equivalent [in its capacity to cause death] to two handbreadths without water. The question was thereupon raised: Where a pit is of nine handbreadths but one of these is full of water, what should be the law? Should we say that since there is not so much water there, there is not [so much] unhealthy air,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And should therefore be subject to the law applicable to a pit of less than ten handbreadths deep. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
כ במאי קמיפלגי ר"א בן יעקב סבר יש ברירה האי לדנפשיה עייל והאי לדנפשיה עייל ורבנן סברי אין ברירה
20 or rather that since the pit is deeper there is there [a quantity of] unhealthy air?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And should thus be equal to that of a pit ten handbreadths deep. ');"><sup>16</sup></span>
כא א"ר אלעזר המוכר בור לחבירו כיון שמסר לו דליו קנה היכי דמי אי בכספא ליקני בכספא אי בחזקה ליקני בחזקה
21 [Again], where the pit is of seven handbreadths and out of these three handbreadths are full of water, what would be the legal position? Should we say that since there is much water there, the unhealthy air is there [in proportion],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And should thus be equal to that of a pit ten handbreadths deep. ');"><sup>16</sup></span>
כב לעולם בחזקה ובעי למימר ליה לך חזק וקני וכיון שמסר לו דליו כמאן דאמ' ליה לך חזק וקני דמי:
22 or rather that since it is not deep, there is no [great quantity of] unhealthy air there?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And should therefore be subject to the law applicable to a pit of less than ten handbreadths deep. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
כג א"ר יהושע בן לוי המוכר בית לחבירו
23 — Let these queries remain undecided. R. Shezbi inquired of Rabbah: If the second digger makes it wider, what would be the law? — He replied: Does he not thereby diminish the unhealthy air?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' What liability had he thus incurred? ');"><sup>17</sup></span> Said the other to him: On the contrary, does he not increase the risk of injury?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' On account of which he should surely bear responsibility. ');"><sup>18</sup></span> — R. Ashi thereupon said: We have to consider whether [the animal] died through bad air, in which case [the second digger could not be responsible as] he diminished the unhealthy air, or whether it died through the fall, in which case [the second digger should be responsible as] he increased the risk of injury. Some report that R. Ashi said: We have to see whether [the animal] fell from this side [which was extended], in which [case the second digger would be responsible as] he increased the risk of injury, or whether it fell from the other side, in which case [the second digger would not be to blame, as] he diminished the unhealthy air in the pit. It was stated: In regard to a pit as deep as it is wide [there is a difference of opinion between] Rabbah and R. Joseph, both of whom made their respective statements in the name of Rabbah b. Bar Hanah who said it in the name of R. Mani. One said that there is always unhealthy air in a pit unless where its width is greater than its depth,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Implying that where the width is just equal to the depth there would still be unhealthy air there. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> the other said that there could never be unhealthy air in a pit unless where its depth was greater than its width.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But where the depth just equalled the width there would be no unhealthy air there. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> IF THE FIRST ONE<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Of the partners. ');"><sup>21</sup></span> PASSED BY AND DID NOT COVER IT&nbsp;… From what point of time will the first one<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Of the partners. ');"><sup>21</sup></span> be exempt from responsibility? — [There was a difference of opinion here between] Rabbah and R. Joseph, both of whom made their respective statements in the name of Rabbah b. Bar Hanah who said it in the name of R. Mani. One said, from the moment when the first partner leaves the second in the act of using the well; the other, from the moment when he hands over the cover of the well to him. [The same difference<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Between Rabbah and R. Joseph. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> is found] between the following Tannaim: If one [partner] was drawing water from a well and the other came along and said to him, 'Leave it to me as I will also draw water', as soon as the first left the second in the act of using it he would become exempt [from any responsibility]. R. Eliezer b. Jacob said: [The exemption commences] from the time that the first hands over the cover to the second. In regard to what principle do they differ? — R. Eliezer b. Jacob held that there is bererah<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., retrospective designation, so that a subsequent selection or definition determines retrospectively a previous state of affairs that was undefined in its nature. ');"><sup>23</sup></span> [so that] the one [partner] was drawing water from his own<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though this water which he subsequently drew was by no means defined at the time when the partnership was formed. ');"><sup>24</sup></span> and so also the other [partner] was drawing the water from his own,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So that one partner does not use the water of the other to become thereby a borrower of it and thus enter into responsibility regarding it. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> whereas the Rabbis maintained that there is no bererah.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So that the water drawn by each of them consists of two parts: one from his own and the other from that of his fellow-partner, with reference to which he in the position of borrower, assuming thus full responsibility also for the part of the partner who is the lender. ');"><sup>26</sup></span> Rabina thereupon said: They<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The Rabbis and R. Eliezer b. Jacob. ');"><sup>27</sup></span> have followed here the same line of reasoning as elsewhere, as we have learnt, Where partners have vowed not to derive benefit from one another they would not be allowed to enter premises jointly owned by them. R. Eliezer b. Jacob, however, says: The one partner enters his own and the other partner enters his own.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And are consequently not deriving any benefit from one another. (Ned. 45b). ');"><sup>28</sup></span> [Now, it was asked there,] in regard to what principle did they differ? — R. Eliezer b. Jacob held that there is bererah so that the one partner would thus be entering his own and the other partner would similarly be entering his own, whereas the Rabbis maintained that there is no bererah. R. Eleazar said: If a man sells a pit to another, as soon as he hands over the cover of the pit to him, the conveyance is complete. What are the circumstances? If money was paid, why was the conveyance not completed by the money?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In accordance with Kid. I, 5. ');"><sup>29</sup></span> If possession was taken [of the pit], why was the conveyance not completed by possession?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In accordance with Kid. I, 5. ');"><sup>29</sup></span> — In fact, we suppose possession to have been taken [of the pit], and it was still requisite for the seller to say to the buyer, 'Go forth, take possession and become the owner',<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' B.B. 53a. ');"><sup>30</sup></span> but as soon as he handed over the cover to him, this was equivalent [in the eyes of the law] to his saying to him, 'Go forth, take possession and complete the conveyance.' R. Joshua b. Levi said: If a person sells a house to another